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The Twin Demons of the Trump-
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Executive Summary 
In the early days of his administration, President Donald Trump signed two 
executive orders directed at changing the regulatory process. One order is 
intended to reduce the cost of regulation. Its fatal flaw, however, is that it 
neglects to account for regulatory benefits. The second order is intended to 
reform the regulatory process. Its fatal flaw is that it adds useless costs to the 
process rather than reducing them. The fear about both orders is that they 
will roll back a range of existing environmental, health, and safety 
protections while blocking the development of future beneficial rules.  
Together, the executive orders constitute a double-barreled assault not just 
on the “administrative state” that White House strategist Steve Bannon has 
promised to “deconstruct,” but on the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and other landmark laws regardless of 
the diseases they prevent, lives they save, pollution they curb or mitigate, 
and the other benefits they produce. In exchange, the orders may well 
hobble the regulatory process itself with new layers of review, making it 
more difficult for regulatory agencies to devote resources to enforce existing 
laws. 
Shortly after the cost-reduction executive order was issued, Public Citizen, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Communications Workers of 
America joined in challenging it in court. Their complaint identifies several 
causes of action, including the charge that the order violates the 
constitutional direction to the president to “take care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,” as well as several statutory directives. The complaint 
goes on to cite a number of proposed rules that, if eliminated by the order, 
would frustrate enabling legislation passed by Congress. For example, the 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act’s purpose is to “reduce traffic accidents and deaths 
and injuries” from traffic accidents, and as the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration implements the law, it must consider a range of 
relevant information on whether a proposed standard is reasonable, 
practicable, and appropriate. The law does not designate that costs alone be 
the determining factor. 
The lawsuit highlights at least three infirmities in the executive order. First, 
the elimination of regulations must comply with statutory and constitutional 
procedures. Regulations cannot be eliminated by executive fiat. Second, 
regulatory reductions cannot be done indiscriminately; instead, regulatory 
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benefits must be considered as a matter of established law. Indeed, specific 
legislation mandates consideration of benefits, and Supreme Court case law 
acknowledges the need to do so. Third, fundamental principles of 
democracy require government to act for the public benefit. These 
constitutional and political obligations are not only ignored, they are 
affirmatively and aggressively rejected by the executive order. 
This last requirement — that government must act for the public benefit — 
has a long history in the United States. Over the decades, the government 
has gone through a number of regulatory cycles, from mercantilism to 
laissez-faire capitalism and from progressivism to deregulation. During those 
cycles, the issue has never been about the presence or absence of 
regulation. Instead, the central issue was how to use government regulation 
to maximize the common good, to maximize social benefits.  
The growth of the regulatory state raised concerns on both sides of the 
political aisle. Beginning with President Jimmy Carter’s administration, 
politicians and policymakers began to question the extent of regulation and, 
in fact, began to deregulate. The Carter administration deregulated airlines, 
trucking, energy, and the financial sector, among others. The deregulatory 
mood became more visible with the election of Ronald Reagan. During his 
administration, deregulation continued, and the Regan Revolution became 
synonymous with deregulation across the board. 
But even as regulation has ebbed and flowed, it has always been the case 
that rules do not indiscriminately impose costs on blameless actors. 
Regulations protecting children from lead poisoning may well impose costs; 
so do clean air regulations directed to power plants to reduce greenhouse 
gas pollution. However, those compliance costs are a necessary corrective to 
market forces that would otherwise encourage individuals and businesses to 
externalize the harmful consequences of their actions or products as much 
as possible. Instead of simply imposing costs on bad actors, regulations 
require the responsible market actors to account for the harms that they 
have inflicted on the public. Regulation, then, is intended to avoid those 
harms in the first place rather than impose them on innocent persons. 
Polluters should not profit from causing asthma or heart disease. Regulation 
or its reduction is not intended to reward malfeasants; it is intended to 
provide compensation, avoid harm, and promote public welfare.  
In some instances, agencies are permitted (and sometimes required) to use 
cost-benefit analysis. However, they may not do so in violation of 
congressional direction. Indeed, no less a conservative than Justice Antonin 
Scalia made the case that when a law directs an agency to set standards 
using some particular measure of regulatory analysis other than costs and 
benefits, the law means what it says. Consequently, the executive order’s 
singular focus on regulatory costs cuts against decades of Supreme Court 
precedent.  
The requirement 
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In a complementary way, just as the benefits of regulation must be 
acknowledged, the costs of failing to regulate properly or not regulate at all 
are a matter of life and death, as the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, the 
Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, and the Big Short mortgage debacle all 
demonstrate. In these and other instances, the failure to regulate results is 
the privatization of benefits and the socialization of costs. Homeowners, not 
bankers, suffered the most severe losses due to the lack of financial 
regulation, and mine workers and oil and gas workers, not CEOs, lost their 
lives for the failure to aggressively pursue safety regulations. Because the 
intent of these executive orders is to reduce regulation, agencies will, at the 
very least, be discouraged, if not thwarted, from enacting new beneficial 
regulations. 
The executive orders have the seemingly reasonable goal of reducing 
regulatory costs. Their devilish methods of doing so, however, are fraught 
with difficulties, including that they ignore constitutional and statutory 
requirements and run contrary to good government practices and policies.  
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Demon 1 
 
The better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven 
there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb. 
The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an 
unjust law. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due 
process will be meticulously observed. 
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977) 
 
 
 
 
Demon 2 
 
ROPER: So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law? 
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the 
law to get after the Devil? 
ROPER: I cut down every law in England to do that! 
MORE: And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 
round on you — where would you hide, Roper, the laws all 
being flat? This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to 
coast . . . and if you cut them down . . . d’you really think you 
could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? 
ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 37-38 (1962) 
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Introduction 
On January 30, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order 
"Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs."1 Then, on February 
24, he signed an executive order on “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform 
Agenda.”2 Together these two executive orders constitute a severe threat to 
American society and the American economy. In the words of Stephen 
Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist, they represent a plan for “the 
deconstruction of the administrative state.”3 
The purpose of the administrative state can be most simply stated this way: 
Unless otherwise stated in the enabling legislation, government regulation 
makes sense when the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs of 
compliance. As this paper demonstrates, social benefits consistently 
outweigh regulatory costs, and the regulatory state is responsive to the 
needs and wishes of the American people; regulation is a response to our 
democratic impulse. Thus, the regulatory state honors our historical and 
traditional constitutional values. The Trump executive orders ignore these 
fundamental principles. Instead of promoting the public good, they risk 
making it increasingly difficult, and sometimes politically impossible, to issue 
new rules that might be regarded as discretionary in nature. Instead, the 
espoused purpose of these orders is to end regulation full stop and, in the 
process, deny millions of Americans the benefits of government and wreak 
havoc on the economy.4  
By doing so, the White House ignores the will of Congress; it ignores 
directives from the United States Supreme Court; and it deserts the 
American public. Simply, the order to eliminate regulations has the effect 
noted by both Thomas More in the above quotation and by Chief Justice 
Burger in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978): It runs the risk of flattening the 
laws and cutting them down to the disadvantage of the public good. The 
order regarding so-called regulatory reform has the effect noted by Grant 
Gilmore: it is intended to increase regulatory oversight to the point at which 
due process is meticulously observed and the regulatory process crumbles 
of its own weight. 
Demon 1: Regulatory Review  
The executive order on regulatory review states that it is the policy of the 
United States to alleviate unnecessary regulatory burdens. Not so ironically, 
the order then goes on to create another layer of regulation by requiring 
each agency to establish a Regulatory Reform Task Force. The purpose of the 
task force is to review regulations and “make recommendations to the 
agency head regarding their repeal, replacement, or modification, consistent 
with applicable law.” At §3(d). Notice the directive does not include 
continuing regulations or expanding them. Rather, it is a one-way ratchet 
downward. 
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The Task Force will be run by a Regulatory Reform Officer (RRO) and is 
required, “at a minimum,” to identify regulations that eliminate jobs, are 
outdated or ineffective, impose costs that exceed benefits, and create 
inconsistencies with existing regulatory reform initiatives, among other 
requirements. In carrying out its obligations, the Task Force must also 
consult with various entities, including states, local and tribal governments, 
small businesses, consumers, non-governmental organizations, and trade 
associations. 
On the surface, regulatory review and the elimination of ineffective rules 
make sense. What is problematic with the new executive order, however, is 
that it is simply adding another layer of review to those that already exist.5 
Consider: (1) the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to review every 
rule that has “a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of 
small entities” within 10 years after the final rule is published; (2) Executive 
Order 12866 requires agencies to develop a program “under which the 
agency will periodically review its existing significant regulations to 
determine whether any such regulations should be modified or eliminated”; 
and (3) Executive Order 13563 establishes a more elaborate program for 
agencies to review their existing regulations and adds time-consuming and 
resource-intensive procedures for carrying out reviews.  
Further, some regulatory reviews are already part of enabling legislation. 
The Clean Air Act, as an example, directs the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to “complete a thorough review” of the agency’s existing 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) and “to make such 
revisions…as may be appropriate” at least once every five years. In addition 
to those reviews, consider the fact that regulations are proposed, 
commented on, and analyzed within individual agencies. In other words, 
proposed rules are critically examined and analyzed internally. Then, the 
White House, through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) also conducts 
assessments of those regulations. 
The executive order on regulatory review does not streamline the regulatory 
process, it adds redundancies. The Trump-Bannon game plan for the 
regulatory process is clear. Hire Grant Gilmore’s Demon 1 and through more 
and more process, obfuscate, do not facilitate, regulation. Demon 1 is bad; it 
tries to kill the regulatory state. Demon 2, though, is the worse of two evils; it 
denies citizens the benefits of government. 
Demon 2: Regulatory Cost Reduction 
Let’s start with a consensus point: Wasteful, redundant, or otherwise 
ineffective regulations should be eliminated. Effective regulations, however, 
confer demonstrable benefits on society and, therefore, must be sustained.6 
The cost reduction executive order does not distinguish between effective 
and ineffective regulations. Instead, it requires that two existing regulations 
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be eliminated for every new one that is adopted. The express point behind 
the order is, of course, the elimination of regulations. As discussed in more 
detail below, the executive order focuses only on costs, not on benefits. The 
narrow focus on costs alone means that using Trump logic, employers 
would never compensate employees because salary is simply a cost on the 
books and, therefore, must be a drag on business. The logic is there, but 
reason is not. 
Certainly, new presidential administrations have the legitimate authority, if 
not the electoral obligation, to put their political and policy preferences into 
practice and into law. That authority, however, is not limitless and cannot be 
exercised without constraints. Rather, White House efforts to reduce 
regulation must be done according to law. More particularly, constitutional 
requirements, statutory directives, and basic good government practices 
impose legal and political obligations on the exercise of White House power.  
Although guidance documents exist regarding the elimination of 
regulations, they do not suggest any constraints on the exercise of that 
power. Instead, they address procedural issues such as the scope of 
coverage7 and how cost-benefit analysis should be applied.8 Neither the 
executive order nor the guidance documents address either the substance 
or priorities regarding the types of regulations that should be eliminated. 
Consequently, elimination will be left to the political and policy preferences 
of an administration that has already exhibited its disdain for the public 
good perhaps best exemplified by what has been called an “immoral” 
“reverse Robin Hood” budget that literally takes from the poor and gives to 
the rich.9  
The singular focus on regulatory cost-cutting presents a triple threat. First, as 
noted, social benefits will be severely discounted or eliminated. Second, the 
executive orders provide incentives for agencies to not act because they add 
regulatory requirements, burdens, and delays. As a direct consequence, 
doing nothing reduces social benefits. And, third, the reduction process will 
be selective and highly politicized. For example, possible federal budget 
cuts include such conservative targets as the EPA, Medicaid, health 
insurance for children, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Legal 
Services Corporation, the National Endowment for the Arts, the National 
Endowment for the Humanities, and the Export-Import Bank, among others, 
regardless of the negligible effect these entities have on the budget.10 This 
cost reduction platform is more than partisan antagonism toward 
regulation. Rather, it is an ideology of destruction all the way down. 
The order, therefore, is fatally flawed because it violates established law as 
well as established principles of our constitutional order. It also violates 
fundamental principles of our modern government. Combined, these legal 
violations have one costly consequence — since numerous regulations will 
all lay flat, citizens, consumers, and the economy as a whole will suffer. 
Presidential 
authority is not 
limitless and 
cannot be 
exercised without 
constraints. 
Rather, White 
House efforts to 
reduce regulation 
must be done 
according to law.  
  
8 | The Twin Demons of the Trump-Bannon Assault on Democracy  
Because the order is silent on regulatory benefits, those benefits will be lost. 
As explicitly noted by the Congressional Research Service, “measuring costs 
without also considering benefits does not provide the context for 
evaluating the appropriateness of the country’s amount of regulation.”11 
Benefits matter. Benefits matter as required by constitutional law, statutory 
and regulatory law, and fundamental good government policy. 
The Public Citizen Complaint 
This white paper opposes the January 30 cost reduction executive order and 
is supportive of a recently filed lawsuit seeking to stop it before harm is 
imposed. Shortly after the order was signed, a complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief was filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia by two public interest organizations and a labor union (Public 
Citizen, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Communications 
Workers of America).12 The complaint sets out several causes of action, 
including the charge that the executive order violates the U.S. Constitution, 
Art. II, §3, which states that the president “take care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”; violates various specific statutory directives; and 
expressly and detrimentally ignores regulatory benefits in contravention of 
sound government, existing law, and public policy. 
The complaint carefully and usefully provides numerous examples of 
proposed rules that, if eliminated by the executive order, would frustrate 
enabling legislation. As one example, the complaint notes that the Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act was enacted “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and 
injuries resulting from traffic accidents.” 49 U.S.C. § 30101. In so regulating, 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) must consider a 
range of relevant information regarding whether a proposed standard is 
reasonable, practicable, and appropriate. The statute does not designate 
costs alone as the determining factor; otherwise, any regulation that 
imposes costs would be subject to elimination.  
The complaint also notes that a proposed rule requiring speed limiting 
devices on motor vehicles has estimated benefits of $500 million to 
$5 billion annually, including fuel savings and the prevention of thousands 
of traffic injuries and deaths. The installation costs of such a rule would be 
minimal but impose social costs from lower speed limits of $200 million to 
$1.5 billion annually. Thus, even accounting for social costs, the benefits 
significantly outweigh costs; yet, pursuant to the executive order, costs 
alone will be assessed to determine whether or not the proposed rule goes 
forward. 
As another example, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) is based on 
congressional findings that “human beings and the environment are being 
exposed each year to a large number of chemical substances and mixtures” 
that “may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment.” 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a). The statute then directs the administrator 
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of the EPA to evaluate existing chemicals under a risk-based safety standard 
“without consideration of costs or other nonrisk factors.” Id. §§ 2604(b)(4)(A), 
(f). On the face of the statute, then, the executive order would appear to be 
inapplicable. However, because the executive order and its guidance 
documents13 allow for cost trading among agencies, it is impossible to 
predict how the costs of TSCA will be counted and assessed for the 
elimination of other regulations in other departments and agencies. 
Under TSCA, the EPA proposed two rules to phase out trichloroethylene 
(TCE), a highly toxic volatile organic compound used in vapor degreasing, 
aerosol degreasing, and spot cleaning in dry cleaning facilities. The EPA 
estimates that one rule will impose costs of $30 million to $45 million 
annually but have net benefits (including health protection benefits) of $35 
million to $402 million annually. The EPA estimates that the other rule will 
impose costs of $170,000 annually but have annual net benefits of $9 million 
to $24.6 million. Once again, because the executive order focuses only on 
costs, if the rules are eliminated, then multi-million dollar losses will be 
imposed on society because social and economic benefits were ignored. 
The complaint against the order specifies other examples of lost benefits 
under such legislation as the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Mine 
Safety and Health Act, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, and the 
Endangered Species Act. Additionally, in its discussion of the Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act, the complaint specifies that the executive order 
precludes cost savings by frustrating cost-saving regulations. By ignoring 
benefits and savings, the executive order does a disservice to Congress and 
to all citizens. 
The Public Citizen lawsuit highlights three fatal infirmities in the executive 
order. First, regulatory reductions cannot be done indiscriminately because 
the benefits of established constitutional law cannot be eliminated without 
the full exposure to agency and judicial review as required by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Motor Vehicle Mtrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). Second, agencies are required to honor enabling legislation and 
carry out congressional instructions. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007), for example, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion by the Bush 
administration’s Environmental Protection Agency that it lacked the 
authority to address carbon pollution affecting climate change. If Congress 
directs an agency to act, then it must act. Third, government must act for the 
public benefit. These constitutional and political obligations are not only 
ignored, they are affirmatively and aggressively rejected by the executive 
order. 
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A History of Government Benefits  
In 1789, the first Congress of the United States passed 26 statutes that were 
signed into law by President George Washington.14 Of those 26 laws, 20 
dealt with the establishment of the executive branch and with government 
regulations regarding import duties, lighthouses, vessels, and pensions. The 
remaining laws addressed governance issues such as treaties with Native 
Americans, the Northwest Territories, and payments to the states. In brief, 
and as amply demonstrated by Yale legal historian Jerry Mashaw,15 the 
United States has always had a regulatory function implemented by 
administrative agencies, and those functions were exercised for the public 
good. 
To be sure, the United States has gone through several regulatory cycles, 
from mercantilism to laissez-faire capitalism and from progressivism to 
deregulation. During those cycles, the issue was never about the presence or 
absence of regulation. Instead, the central issue was how to use government 
regulation to maximize the common good, to maximize social benefits. 
Indeed, defining the public interest has always been open to political debate 
and deliberation. Yet, even the fight between Hamiltonians and 
Jeffersonians about the proper role of government was not a fight about the 
wisdom of government regulation; it was a fight about its proper locus. 
Hamilton believed a central government was necessary so the newly formed 
United States could play on the world’s economic stage. Jefferson believed 
an agrarian society could best protect individual liberty. Both, however, were 
committed to using regulation for the commonweal. This regulatory and 
mercantilist commitment was later dubbed the American System by Henry 
Clay; a system that established a three-pronged national economic policy of 
government support for infrastructure, nascent industries, and fiscal 
controls. In short, the American System was a system based on government 
regulation.16 
Political and legal scholars, as well as economists, regularly debate the 
wisdom of one form of regulation or another. Whether it involved protecting 
corporate charters in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) or 
granting or withholding monopolies in Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837), the fundamental issue is that regulation is 
grounded in the public interest as a matter of constitutional law. In 
Dartmouth College, Chief Justice John Marshall explicitly noted that the 
corporate charter involved in that case was deemed “beneficial to the 
country.” 17 U.S at 638. Similarly, in Charles River Bridge, Chief Justice Roger 
Taney established a rule of construction that required statutes to be 
construed “in favor of the public.” 36 U.S. at 544. At no time in U.S. history 
has the Court condoned the arbitrary and capricious elimination of 
regulations intended to benefit the public interest. 
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As legal historian Herbert Hovenkamp has written, “American governments 
have always been involved in economic development and the creation of 
infrastructure, although both the amount and nature of the involvement 
change over time.”17 Of particular note is the fact that with Andrew Jackson’s 
election, government economic policy and regulation shifted from 
mercantilism to laissez-faire. The shift to such an economic policy lessened 
federal government intervention, but it did not eliminate it. Jacksonian 
populism was aimed at federal corruption, and he looked to the states to 
protect economic liberty. In response to Jacksonian concerns, to ensure 
against cronyism and legislative capture, the Supreme Court explicitly 
articulated a public use test for regulatory activity. Loan Association v. 
Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874) (taxation); United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. 
Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (takings). The public use requirement means that 
government action should be intended to generate public benefits.  
By the mid-19th century, the U.S. economy was evolving rapidly through 
northern migration, immigration, urbanization, and, most importantly, 
industrialization. One dramatic consequence of all of those trends was that 
corporate concentration began to have negative effects on the economy 
and on the citizenry. Increased economic inequality led to the Gilded Age, 
increased poverty and illness, and increased risks to consumers. These 
trends, in turn, had the pernicious effect of creating an economic underclass 
that felt powerless to combat growing social and economic ills. In response, 
a new form of countervailing power was needed to balance industrial 
strength. The federal government was seen as the institution to 
counterbalance private power, to protect markets from abuse, and to relieve 
citizen suffering.  
By way of example, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) is generally 
considered to be the first modern administrative law case, and it 
demonstrates the power of government to correct market abuses. Shortly 
thereafter, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was created in 1887 
as the first modern administrative agency. These two developments 
emphasize the combined role of Congress and the executive branch in 
adopting and implementing public-regarding regulatory initiatives. 
Munn is significant precisely for setting out the contours for modern 
regulation. At issue in the case was an Illinois statute setting the prices for 
grain elevators because they were exercising both monopoly and 
monopsony power. Farmers who sold grain to the elevators were underpaid, 
and consumers who bought that grain paid too much for it because of the 
market power exercised by the elevators. In reviewing the constitutionality 
of the Illinois legislation, the Supreme Court established two principles for 
modern regulation. First, the Court recognized that governments have long 
regulated industries that exercised monopoly power, even to the point of 
allowing government to set a private firm’s prices. In short, the first element 
necessary before a regulation is adopted is to identify a market failure. 
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Second, the subject to be regulated must be determined to be in the public 
interest. In Munn, the Court acknowledged that setting fair and reasonable 
grain prices in the country’s breadbasket was clearly in the public interest. 
The ICC complemented the regulatory principles of Munn. The agency was 
created to monitor abuses of railroad rates. It was seen as an institution that 
was nonpolitical, expert, technically proficient, and could correct economic 
dislocations. After the creation of the ICC, and in response to corporate and 
industrial concentration, similar legislation was passed to correct for the 
abuses of monopoly power (Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 26 Stat. 209 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717); provide for 
hydropower (the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063); address airline safety (the 
Air Commerce Act of 192 6, 44 Stat. 568); and the like.  
This legislation led to the establishment of administrative agencies including 
the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Federal Power Commission, and others. These agencies, like the ICC before 
them, were seen as technically proficient expert administrators that were 
tasked by Congress to address social and economic problems in the public 
interest and for the benefit of all. In addition to market corrections, agencies 
were also created to protect citizens from social harms. Congress specifically 
identified problems such as tainted meat (the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 
1906, 34 Stat. 1256) and adulterated food and drugs (the Pure Food and 
Drug Act of 1096, 34 Stat. 768) and passed legislation to provide 
government protection from those dangers.  
All of this legislative and administrative activity took place before the 
proliferation of New Deal and Great Society agencies. The New Deal and the 
Great Society created new sets of agencies and expanded the scope and 
reach of government. Although they were directed to address different sets 
of problems, both were created in the public interest and directed to 
advance the public benefit. New Deal economic legislation was intended to 
accomplish three things — develop a national infrastructure, particularly in 
energy (the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 847, and the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 
821); regulate and stabilize markets, particularly though disclosure and 
financial reporting (Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881); and promote and support a middle 
class, particularly through the creation of safety nets and by empowering 
labor organizations (Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, and the 
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449), among other legislation.  
Rather than focusing on economy-wide reforms, Great Society legislation 
was directed at solving social problems, especially those affecting health, 
safety, and welfare. Most notably, the Great Society directed attention to 
and the federal protection of civil rights (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 
241, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437). Additionally, legislation 
of that period addressed problems of the environment (National 
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Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852), worker safety (Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, 84 Stat. 1590), consumer protection (Consumer 
Product Safety Act, 81 Stat. 466), and poverty (Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964, 78 Stat. 508). What distinguishes the New Deal from the Great Society, 
then, is that New Deal legislation and agencies buoyed the economy while 
Great Society legislation and agencies improved social welfare. 
In both instances, new agencies were created and new regulations were 
adopted to implement legislation intended to generate public benefits. In 
each case, the legislation was expressly directed to serving the “public 
interest” in general or individual statutes identified a more specific public 
interest such as preventing racial discrimination, fighting poverty, protecting 
workers, or preserving the environment.  
Any legal transition comes with some costs as clearly articulated by Justice 
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922): 
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law.” Holmes’ argument is that regulation in the public interest 
can impose costs on select private individuals in exchange for overall 
benefits to society. More significantly, however, those costs are imposed on 
those actors who caused social harms. Regulation, as Holmes knew, is based 
on a principle of cost causation. 
The reality of regulation is that regulations do not indiscriminately impose 
costs on blameless actors. Regulations protecting children from lead 
poisoning may well impose costs; so do clean air regulations directed to 
power plants to reduce greenhouse gas pollution. However, those 
compliance costs are imposed on the culpable; they require bad actors to 
account for the harms that they have inflicted on the public. Regulation, 
then, is intended to avoid those harms in the first place rather than impose 
them on innocent persons. Polluter profits should not be made at the 
expense of citizen asthma or heart disease.18 Regulation or its reduction is 
not intended to reward malfeasants; it is intended to provide compensation, 
avoid harm, and promote public welfare.  
The executive order at issue does exactly the opposite. By its very terms, the 
order is directed to protecting “private expenditures” at the expense of 
public benefits. The order should be struck down because by neglecting 
benefits, it contravenes the political history and constitutional values of the 
United States. 
Protecting Market and Nonmarket Values through Regulation 
After the spate of New Deal economic regulation, policymakers perceived a 
need for uniformity among agency procedures. In order to bring that 
uniformity, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 
Stat. 237. Then, after the passage of Great Society social legislation, 
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administrative law scholars and economists sought uniformity among 
substantive agency actions.  
The work of economist Alfred Kahn19 and Justice Stephen Breyer20 
responded to that call for regulatory uniformity. Both authors identified a 
model of regulation that was based on a straightforward and simple idea. 
Government regulation had been and should be used to correct market 
failures. Most often, those failures resulted from economic dislocations in 
malfunctioning or inefficient markets. The same principles of market failure, 
though, also apply to nonmarket values. Individuals can be disadvantaged 
as a result of an unfair economic distribution or as a result of illegitimate 
discrimination. Government regulation, then, can be used to correct market 
failures, and it can be used to protect nonmarket values such as civil and 
political rights and liberties.21  
Regulation can address cases of both market and nonmarket failures, and 
the goal of that regulation, as leading regulatory casebooks demonstrate, is 
to further public benefits either by reducing harms or by providing publicly 
valuable goods and services. Economic regulation is design to promote 
economy-wide efficiency, and social regulation is designed to promote 
nationwide fairness and equality.22 Both approaches, economic and social, 
are intended to improve the lives of the citizenry and to enable them to 
participate in political and economic markets. Such participation advances 
our democracy. 
There is regulation at every level of government, and its scope is ubiquitous. 
It touches our lives, from federal and local taxes to environmental rules and 
regulations, and from local school requirements to interstate oil pipelines. 
Despite the ubiquity, however, government intervenes in private markets for 
only a handful of reasons, and it uses only a handful of regulatory tools to do 
so.  
By way of example, regulations are used to assure the public that services 
are safe and reliable and that assurance can be given through licensing. 
Licenses, in turn, can be used to certify lawyers, doctors, and other 
professionals, and licenses can be used to market potentially dangerous 
drugs or even authorize a nuclear power plant to generate electricity.  
As other examples, to the extent that a market may be subject to 
monopolization, regulations can ensure that electricity and gas prices are 
fair and reasonable through ratemaking. To the extent that as consumers, 
we lack information about drugs or about what is contained in the foods we 
eat, then regulations can require that information be provided to better 
inform our consumer choices.  
The simple point is that as varied and as extensive as government regulation 
is, there are only a limited number of regulatory tools, and they are all 
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intended to either improve economic markets or protect us from either 
economic harm or other from forms of disadvantages and social pain. 
Regulations are not intended to protect private expenditures alone; they are 
intended to promote the public good. 
Counting Regulatory Benefits  
The growth of the regulatory state raised concerns on both sides of the 
political aisle. Beginning with President Jimmy Carter’s administration, 
politicians and policymakers began to question the extent of regulation and, 
in fact, began to deregulate. The Carter administration deregulated airlines, 
trucking, energy, and the financial sector, among others. The deregulatory 
mood became more visible with the election of Ronald Reagan. During his 
administration, deregulation continued, and the Regan Revolution became 
synonymous with deregulation across the board.23 
The deregulatory efforts of the Carter and Reagan presidencies, however, are 
distinguishable. Carter’s deregulatory initiatives started with the proposition 
that regulation should fix broken markets. If the cost of regulation exceeded 
the benefits of the regulatory checks, then competitive markets were 
preferable. However, if government regulation could improve efficiency, 
then regulation was preferable to unconstrained markets. In short, 
regulation under Carter assessed costs and benefits for the purpose of 
promoting competition. 
As noted, Reagan deregulated across the board. Instead of asking whether 
or not regulation facilitated or inhibited competitive markets, Reagan’s 
deregulation was based on an anti-government animus as revealed in such 
slogans as “trickle-down economics,” and “don’t tax, don’t spend.” Those 
simple slogans gave way to a more full-throated ideology known as 
neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism was more concerned about the size, reach, and cost of 
government than it was about competitive markets. It was based on two 
principles: promote markets and demonize government. That neoliberal 
spirit infuses the Trump executive order that is directed at regulatory cost 
reduction in favor of free markets in name only.  
The qualification about markets “in name only” is to indicate that there is no 
such thing as a free market in a mixed market economy. Neoliberal 
sloganeers proselytized as if there was a choice between “free markets” and 
“big government.” This choice is as simplistic as it is wrong. Instead, 
government involvement with markets is as extensive as it is necessary. 
Government regulation can be seen in the common law baseline of 
contracts, torts, and property law, and it can be seen in macroeconomic 
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controls such as central banking and rules regarding the amount of credit 
available at any one time.  
In other words, the proper mix of government and markets generates 
economic and social benefits. Focusing on regulatory costs without 
accounting for benefits upsets the balance between government and 
markets and may do so not only to the detriment of markets themselves, but 
also to individual lives. Problematically, this narrow focus on costs is based 
on flawed research and a fundamental analytic error. 
The False Concern about Regulatory Costs  
The concern, one might even say obsession, with regulatory costs has long 
been a staple of government critics. Most notably, critics argue that 
regulation costs the U.S. economy $2 trillion per year. That figure is based 
upon a study prepared for the National Association of Manufacturers and 
authored by two Lafayette College economists, Nicole C. Crain and W. Mark 
Crain, who based their $2 trillion estimate by simply updating a previous 
study.24 That previous study was widely cited by neoliberals both inside and 
outside of government. Two glaring problems with the Crain & Crain analysis 
render it defective.  
First, the report relies on a “top-down” methodology for 75 percent of its 
cost calculation rather than relying on the actual cost estimates used by 
agencies. The methodology relies upon macroeconomic variables and 
modeling techniques to measure the effect of regulation on the economy as 
a whole.25 
To reach their trillion dollar estimates, Crain & Crain used information from 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development to compare 
national economies and to infer the cost of regulation from that information. 
They employed a proxy measure of the amount of regulation based upon 
the Global Competitive Index, which is a component of the Global 
Competitiveness Report that measures various aspects of the institutions, 
policies, and other factors to determine a country’s productivity level.  
The cost comparisons from that report are based upon an Executive Opinion 
Survey from which Crain & Crain extracted only three questions. They relied 
upon responses to questions asking executives to comment on the burden 
of government regulation, the efficiency of the legal framework used to 
challenge regulation, and the regulation of a country’s securities exchanges. 
Executives were asked to measure those indicia on a 1 to 7 point scale. Crain 
& Crain then accumulated the survey results, determined mean values, ran 
regression analyses, and, after using a hypothetical benchmark, concluded 
that their findings were “statistically significant.”26 Regardless of that 
conclusion, executive perception is a proxy data point; it is not based upon 
accurate or actual empirical evidence. 
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Official concerns were raised about the reliability of the report, including 
one by the Office of Advocacy, the entity which granted the Crains the 
contract for this research. The Office of Advocacy posted the report on its 
website with the following caveat: “the findings of the study have been 
taken out of context and certain theoretical estimates of costs have been 
presented publicly as verifiable facts.”27 In addition to criticism by the Office 
of Advocacy, the Congressional Research Service28 and the Government 
Accountability Office29 also questioned the reliability of the Crain & Crain 
analysis.  
The second fatal flaw in the Crain & Crain analysis is even more damning. 
They did not look at the economic value of regulatory benefits. By their own 
admission, they failed to account for benefits because they were not asked 
to do so.30 The Crain & Crain report may have fared better if it was based on 
solid cost-benefit analysis. 
The Importance of Regulatory Benefits  
Since the Reagan administration, such influences as the law and economics 
movement, neoliberalism or market liberalization, free market 
fundamentalism, and the like have promoted quantitative analysis, more 
specifically cost-benefit analysis, as a methodology to assess government 
programs, reduce costs, and deregulate. Indeed, some scholars believe that 
our administrative government constitutes a cost-benefit state, 31 although 
our analysis need not take us that far.  
The history and development of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is continuing, 
and agencies have significant flexibility in how to use this methodology. It 
must be noted and emphasized, however, that many, if not most, 
environmental, health, and safety statutes direct agencies to use some 
alternative such as feasibility or specific health or technology standards. 
Since CBA was first used by the Army Corps of Engineers to evaluate which 
public projects to pursue in the 1930s,32 through the development of 
environmental economics, to current attempts to assess the value of human 
life and calculate the current value of future benefits, CBA has had its 
proponents as well as its critics.33 Regardless of the controversies 
surrounding the application of CBA, two things are clear. First, CBA is now a 
part of the regulatory state as a matter of administrative practice, executive 
orders, and judicial decisions. Critically, though, there are many “kinds” of 
CBA (i.e., CBA is a broad term that describes a wide variety of methodologies 
for considering a rule’s costs and benefits and does not necessarily require 
the conversion of all the rule’s costs and benefits into monetary values and 
then directly balancing the two to find the economically “optimal” level of 
regulation), and the type that agencies use will vary greatly depending on 
the statute they are implementing. Indeed, as explained, the Supreme Court 
has consistently endorsed the notion that agencies retain a great detail of 
discretion in determining how to perform CBA for particular rules. 
  
18 | The Twin Demons of the Trump-Bannon Assault on Democracy  
Second, exactly as its name indicates, CBA involves the consideration of both 
a rule’s costs and benefits, and the failure to consider either renders the 
methodology meaningless. Yet, the executive order on reducing regulatory 
costs conspicuously departs from this approach by focusing exclusively on 
costs without addressing benefits.34 To be sure, since the executive order’s 
issuance, OIRA, which is taking the lead in overseeing agency compliance 
with the order’s requirements, has published guidance that instructs 
agencies to continue subjecting their new rules as well as the repealed ones 
to CBA.35 This guidance, however, directly contradicts the cost-only focus of 
the executive order, which raises significant questions of whether and to 
what extent agencies would be able to take it seriously when attempting to 
comply with the order.) 
The executive branch has relied on CBA as a principal assessment tool for 
over 40 years. President Reagan, with Executive Orders 12291 and 12498, 
required agencies to utilize CBA and to issue an annual regulatory plan for 
review by the Office of Management and Budget. President Bill Clinton, 
through Executive Order 12866, and President Barack Obama, through 
Executive Order 13563, adopted the essential features of the earlier CBA 
orders and required agencies to assess both costs and benefits of regulation 
and to proceed with them only when benefits “justify” the regulatory costs.  
Questions about the proper scope and application of CBA, however, remain, 
and those questions continue to be addressed by the judiciary. In short, 
though, the direction is clear. Subject to statutory limitations, the Supreme 
Court generally regards some form of agency consideration of regulatory 
costs and benefits to be part of a rational decision-making process, though it 
has been careful to leave the precise manner in which this consideration 
takes place to the discretion of the rulemaking agencies. Significantly, even 
while endorsing this discretion, Justices across the political spectrum 
continue to maintain a presumption against the use of the most formal 
approach to CBA, which involves the attempt to quantify and monetize all 
regulatory costs and benefits and then to precisely balance those monetized 
costs and benefits to identify the level of regulatory stringency that achieves 
social optimality.36 
The key to understanding the permissible use of CBA starts with the statute. 
A statute can require or permit some form of CBA or it may limit its 
application. Where the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue — which is 
the bulk of the cases — the agency retains considerable discretion over how 
costs and benefits are assessed and considered. 
The central case for limiting an agency’s use of CBA is American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). The Court was 
asked to decide whether the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) needed to cost-justify a cotton dust regulation. Enabling legislation 
directs OSHA to establish standards for toxic materials “which most 
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adequately ensures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity.” 29 U.S.C §655(b)(5) 
(2012). The Court rejected the use of CBA as inconsistent with that statutory 
requirement: 
“[C]ongress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits, 
by placing the ‘benefit’ of worker health above all other considerations save 
those making the attainment of this ‘benefit’ unachievable. Any standard 
based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a 
different balance than that struck by Congress inconsistent with the 
command set forth in §6 (b) (5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not 
required by the statute because feasibility analysis is.” 427 U.S. at 509. 
American Textile remains good law and its significance to the executive 
order must be underscored. Specifically, Congress can require an agency to 
regulate according to a standard other than formal, economic CBA. Most 
importantly, that standard is one that serves the public interest and not the 
interest of any private industry or concern. 
Since American Textile, the Court has addressed other CBA issues 
particularly relevant to environmental regulation. The strongest statement 
regarding a limitation on CBA comes from Justice Scalia in Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), a case dealing with the 
Clean Air Act. Pursuant to the act, the EPA administrator is required to set 
ambient air standards for certain common air pollutants. The industry 
argued that when reviewing or revising standards, the administrator must 
consider costs. Justice Scalia rejected that argument: 
“Section 109(b)(1) instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air quality 
standards ‘the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to 
protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety.’ [O]ne would 
have thought it fairly clear that this text does not permit the EPA to consider 
costs in setting the standards. . . . Nowhere are the costs of achieving such a 
standard made part of that initial decision.” 531 U.S. at 465. 
Again, the point should be clear. When a statute sets out public benefits as 
the determinative decision-making criterion, then costs are not to be 
considered. Consequently, for those statutes that specify regulatory 
standards that forbid consideration of costs, then the singular focus on 
regulatory costs of the executive order directly violates Supreme Court 
rulings. 
Since American Trucking, the Court has provided agencies with additional 
guidance on the use of CBA and the consideration of regulatory costs 
consistent with different statutory mandates. The essential thrust of these 
cases is that where not specifically prohibited by law, agencies generally 
must undertake some assessment of costs and benefits as part of their 
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regulatory decision-making, though the manner in which this consideration 
is undertaken is committed to agency discretion. Notably, though, the Court 
has indicated one potential caveat to this broader grant of discretion — 
namely, it has consistently expressed a strong skepticism of the kind of 
formal CBA endorsed by neoliberal economists, preferring instead more 
informal approaches to measuring and comparing a rule’s advantages and 
disadvantages. 
In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009), for example, the 
EPA declined to require the use of a particular technology for cooling power 
plants because of its expense. The statute required that a regulation reflect 
the “best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental 
impact,” Clean Water Act §316(b), 33 U.S.C. §1326(b) (2012). Justice Scalia 
noted that the enabling legislation did not “tie the agency’s hands as to 
whether cost-benefit analysis should be used.” 
Justice Scalia then distinguished American Textile and American Trucking 
and ruled that if the statute is silent about CBA, that does not mean that an 
agency is not permitted to use it. He did, however, make it clear that the 
Court might well take a different view were the agency to engage in a more 
formal cost-benefit analysis, noting that more “rigorous form[s] of cost-
effective benefit analysis” might be “preclude[d].” 556 U.S. 223; see also at 
235 (Breyer, J. concurring) (“The EPA’s reading of the statute seems to permit 
it to describe environmental benefits in non-monetized terms and to 
evaluate both costs and benefits in accordance with its expert judgment and 
scientific knowledge. The Agency can thereby avoid lengthy formal cost-
benefit proceedings and futile attempts at comprehensive monetization 
[and] take account of Congress’ technology-forcing objectives.”) 
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S.Ct. 1584 (2014) is in accord. In 
that case, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, ruled that the EPA 
may consider costs along with benefits in setting rules regarding interstate 
air pollution for the express intent of improving air quality across state 
borders thus generating health benefits. 
The most recent and most significant case to weigh in on agency use of CBA 
is Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). The Court was asked to review EPA 
regulations limiting toxic emissions from power plants. The EPA determined 
that given a statutory ambiguity, it was not required to consider costs in 
making a threshold determination about whether to limit the toxic 
emissions, but later incorporated cost considerations into its final 
determination of how to set the actual limits on the toxic air pollutants.  
In the opinion for a 5-4 Court, Justice Scalia wrote that it is not “even 
rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars of economic 
costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.”135 S. 
Ct. at 2707. In dissent, Justice Kagan argued that the EPA had adequately 
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considered costs, just at the second step in its two-step decision-making 
process. Regarding that aspect of the agency’s decision-making, she wrote 
that “[c]ost is almost always a relevant — and usually, a highly important — 
factor in regulation.” 135 S. Ct. at 2716-17. The important point to emphasize 
is that cost considerations are weighed against beneficial ones. In other 
words, an agency’s consideration of costs does not occur in a vacuum. 
Instead, cost considerations occur with a thorough and detailed 
consideration of public benefits, which constitutes the very purpose of the 
statute. Indeed, the EPA finding in that case was based on an 800-page 
report that cataloged the public health harms caused by power plant 
emissions of mercury and other toxic air pollutants. 
In Michigan v. EPA, both Justice Scalia and Justice Kagan recognized that the 
EPA was obliged to consider costs and benefits. Most importantly, though, 
Justice Scalia wrote that while an agency had to account for costs in some 
way, “a formal cost- benefit analysis in which each advantage and 
disadvantage is assigned a monetary value” was not required (135 S. Ct. at 
2711). Thus the majority and the dissent determined that the manner in 
which the costs must be weighed against the benefits should be left to the 
discretion of the EPA, while both Justices indicated their skepticism about 
the use of formal CBA. 
Although open issues remain concerning the use of CBA, there is universal 
agreement about its application when it is used to assess regulations: Costs 
and benefits must be weighed against each other in some manner. Benefits 
cannot be ignored because benefits matter; they matter in promoting the 
public interest as identified by Congress. Such consideration of benefits and 
concern for the public interest is ignored by the executive order and, 
therefore, it is constitutionally infirm.  
To complete the point, it must be added that by ignoring benefits, not only 
is the will of Congress ignored but with it so is the public interest and the 
public good of the country because regulations produce public benefits.37 
Benefits Matter as a Matter of Law and as a Matter of Good Policy  
The executive order mandating the elimination of two regulations for every 
new one adopted without considering benefits is an extreme form of what is 
known as the “pay-go” approach to regulation, an approach that the Center 
for Progressive Reform has criticized in the past.38 In the “pay-go” approach, 
there can be a 1-to-1, 2-to-1, or even 3-to-1 trade-off between old and new 
regulations. In other words, for every one new regulation, one or two or 
three old ones must be eliminated as cost-reduction measures. However, if 
the focus is exclusively on costs, then such an approach is something that 
law and policy do not allow. 
In contrast to past efforts at so-called regulatory reform, the objective of a 
cost-only pay-go approach is not to improve the quality of individual 
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regulatory decisions, but rather to put an arbitrary cap on the total amount 
of regulation through the establishment of a regulatory budget. However, 
regulatory budgets can constrain agencies and impede their ability to carry 
out congressional directives at the risk of increasing public harm.39 The 
executive order has the same intent; it also has the same defect in that 
benefits are ignored when calculating the trade-offs. Some countries, such 
as the United Kingdom and Australia, have adopted “pay-go” that does not 
completely ignore benefits.40 Instead, they measure “net direct costs,” that is, 
the remaining costs imposed on businesses after all the benefits that the 
regulation provides those businesses have been subtracted out. Of course, it 
is easy to argue that regulations are too burdensome and they should be 
reduced. Paperwork and reporting requirements, as examples, as well as 
reducing the amount of time spent in regulatory review can reduce 
regulatory costs with little or no impact on benefits delivered. Unfortunately, 
the executive order is not limited to paperwork reduction or to streamlining 
regulatory processes. Rather, given the rhetoric surrounding the signing of 
the executive order, substantive regulations, most notably environmental 
regulations, are the targets.41 
The importance of regulatory benefits must be underscored.42 OMB, for 
example, estimates that regulatory benefits exceed regulatory costs by 7-to-
1 for significant regulations,43 and that for 2014, the total costs of federal 
regulation ranged from between $68.5 to $101.8 billion while total benefits 
ranged from $261.7 to $1,042.1 billion.44 The EPA estimates that the 
regulatory benefits of the Clean Air Act exceed costs by a 25-to-1 ratio,45 and 
another EPA study found that regulatory benefits exceeded costs by ratios 
as high as 22-to-1.46 And, as noted earlier, the Congressional Research 
Service is in accord with the EPA’s positive assessment of regulation.47 By 
way of simple example, the EPA estimates that vehicle fuel standards will 
provide net benefits to society estimated at $100 billion.48 
Just as the benefits of regulation must be acknowledged, the costs of failing 
to regulate properly or not regulate at all are a matter of life and death. 
Simply consider that the BP Deepwater Horizon49 and the Upper Big Branch 
Mine disasters50 and the Big Short mortgage debacle51 have all been 
attributed to the failure to regulate; they were not attributable to over-
regulation. And they cost society considerably. 
Most harshly, the failure to regulate has resulted in the privatization of 
benefits and the socialization of costs. Homeowners, not bankers, suffered 
the most severe losses due to the lack of financial regulation, and mine 
workers and oil and gas workers, not CEOs, lost their lives for the failure to 
aggressively pursue safety regulations. Indeed, while one coal mine owner 
was sentenced to a meager year in prison for persistently failing to address 
hazardous conditions that led to the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster that 
cost the lives of 29 workers,52 other CEOs escaped any sanction at all53 and 
their companies thrived. The bank executives who were responsible for 
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bringing the world economy to the brink of a global depression were 
rewarded with bonuses, and their banks have never been richer. Something 
is wrong with a society that tolerates such injustice, and that is the type of 
society that will be perpetuated, not reversed, by the executive order.  
Conclusion 
The Trump administration’s two main deregulatory executive orders have 
the reasonable goal of reducing regulatory costs. Their devilish methods of 
doing so, however, are fraught with difficulties, and the difficulties are 
literally fatal. The regulatory review measures of Demon 1 threaten to 
collapse the regulatory process by micromanagement, and the regulatory 
cost-reduction measures of Demon 2 threaten to extract valuable benefits 
from good government regulation. These twin threats raise risks to our lives 
as well as to the economy as a whole.  
As troubling as the so-called regulatory reforms and the cost-cutting 
measures are, even more troubling is the reality that the regulatory cuts will 
be used politically to advance the Trump administration’s social agenda. The 
reforms and the cuts will not be used for the economic benefit of the United 
States let alone for the benefit of all of its citizens. Instead, the reforms and 
the cuts will be visited on those least in a position to protect themselves. 
Consider actions already taken and contemplated:  
 Reducing protections for transgender students54 and consumers;55  
 Eliminating environmental protections generally;56  
 Reversing the Obama’s administration’s clean energy efforts more 
specifically;57  
 Even more specifically, withdrawing the United States from the 
international Paris Climate Agreement signed by nearly 200 
countries;58 
 Aggressively ignoring science to the benefit of insecticide 
manufacturers;59 
 Arrogantly ignoring forensic science in the Department of Justice;60  
 Defunding legal services61 and the arts;62  
 Fouling streams and endangering drinking water;63 
 Rolling back privacy protections by the FCC;64 
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 The Attorney General’s skepticism about official reports of police 
racism;65  
 Overturning the Obama administration’s gun restrictions for the 
mentally ill;66  
 Pursuing an immigration ban unrelated to any identified harms;67  
 Promoting inhumane private prisons;68  
 Demonizing the media as the enemy of the people;69  
 Reducing privacy rights for citizens70 and non-citizens;71 reducing 
healthcare coverage while raising healthcare prices;72  
 Halting investigations of methane leaks73 and efforts to promote 
competition in the communications industry;74 
 Financing private charter schools at the expense of public 
education;75 and,  
 Most insipidly and hatefully, building a multi-billion dollar spite 
fence,76 among other actions.  
Instead of issuing executive orders that ignore constitutional and statutory 
requirements and run contrary to good government practices and policies, 
the Trump administration, and other presidential administrations to follow, 
should identify reforms that will strengthen the regulatory system so that 
executive agencies are better able to carry out their missions of protecting 
people and the environment. 
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